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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
A. Introduction 
 
This matter comes on before this court in this action 
under the Employment Retirement Income Security Act 
("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. SS 1001 et seq ., on the defendants' 
appeal from orders of the district court entered August 6, 
1998, awarding severance benefits and October 19, 1998, 
awarding the plaintiffs attorney's fees and prejudgment 
interest. In addition, the matter is before this court on the 
plaintiffs' cross-appeal from an order entered August 17, 
1995, dismissing plaintiffs' appeal to the district court from 
a magistrate judge's order imposing sanctions on the 
plaintiffs and from a subsequent order of the district court 
on June 23, 1998, expanding the sanctions by precluding 
the plaintiffs from offering certain testimony at trial. This 
litigation stems from the defendant Thomas & Betts ("T&B") 
Corporation's decision to relocate particular business 
operations and employees from Bridgewater, New Jersey, to 
Memphis, Tennessee, and its related determination that 
certain employees who refused to relocate would not receive 
benefits under its severance plan. T&B manufactures and 
sells connectors, fittings and wiring accessories for the 
electrical and electronic industries. Plaintiffs Peter Noorily, 
Raymond Nastawa, Sidney Levy and William Deck were 
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product engineers in T&B's Electrical Division in 
Bridgewater who refused to relocate to Memphis. 
 
B. Factual History 
 
In November 1991, T&B signed an agreement to acquire 
American Electric, a manufacturer of electrical products 
and accessories. Inasmuch as T&B then decided to relocate 
its Electrical Division to Memphis it held meetings in early 
December 1991 to inform its employees of the impending 
relocation. In at least one of these meetings T&B's 
management, in response to a question posed by a product 
engineer, stated that employees choosing not to relocate 
would receive severance payments from T&B's unfunded 
benefit plan. Additionally, Richard Lovell, then director of 
Human Resources in T&B's Electrical Division, told Noorily 
and Levy that T&B would make severance payments to 
employees who decided not to relocate. Plaintiffs, however, 
do not dispute T&B's assertion that it wanted them to 
relocate to Memphis and they concede that "this action 
does not involve any claims of discrimination." Br. at 21. 
 
On December 6, 1991, Lovell issued a memorandum 
discussing T&B's severance policy in connection with the 
relocation. Although T&B marked the memorandum 
confidential and intended it merely to be a guide to 
managers seeking to answer employee questions, it 
acknowledges that the memorandum was circulated widely 
among the employees. The memorandum stated that T&B 
would deny severance benefits only to employees who left 
prior to the release date or who agreed to relocate and then 
changed their minds. Moreover, it specified that employees 
who chose not to relocate but who remained with T&B until 
the release date would receive severance payments. At that 
time, T&B's severance policy provided for benefits to 
employees who were "involuntarily terminated" when "the 
terminating manager believes the granting of such pay is 
appropriate." 
 
T&B's management made the statements concerning 
severance benefits believing that a large majority of the 35 
product managers and engineers in its Electrical Division 
would relocate. T&B regarded their relocation as critical 
because it viewed its product managers and engineers as 
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"key" employees. By the end of December 1991, however, 
T&B's management recognized that many of the product 
engineers did not want to relocate. T&B was concerned 
about their reluctance as it considered that the engineers' 
absence could affect the success of the pending merger. 
Moreover, T&B's management decided that it would be 
counterproductive to offer the engineers who refused to 
relocate severance benefits as the benefits themselves 
would encourage them not to relocate. Therefore, Kevin 
Dunnigan, the president of T&B, determined that any 
engineer whom T&B asked to relocate, but who refused, 
would not receive severance benefits because T&B would 
consider the refusal as a voluntary resignation. The 
plaintiffs received a memorandum on January 6, 1992, 
informing them of this decision but each objected to T&B's 
position and refused to sign an attached document 
indicating he was resigning. There can be no doubt that 
T&B's stated wish that the engineers relocate was not 
pretextual as T&B offered them substantial financial 
incentives to do so. 
 
The plaintiffs, however, for compelling personal reasons 
decided not to relocate. All had longstanding ties to their 
communities as well as obligations to family members. 
Further, the plaintiffs considered their age and T&B's 
refusal to guarantee them long-term work in Memphis as 
reasons not to relocate. Thus, Noorily was 61 years old at 
the time of the relocation and had worked for T&B for over 
22 years. With his wife, he was responsible for caring for 
both his mother and mother-in-law, who was nearly 
bedridden. Nastawa was 45 years old in January 1992, and 
had worked for T&B for 17 years. He also cared for his 
extremely ill mother-in-law and had children attending 
school in New Jersey. Furthermore, his wife had an 
established career in the area. Levy had worked for T&B for 
over 20 years at the time of the relocation and was 59 years 
old. He and his wife provided care to his mother and 
mother-in-law. Finally, Deck was 59 years old at the time 
of the relocation and had worked for T&B for over 25 years. 
Like the other plaintiffs, he had significant family 
responsibilities as he was the primary caregiver for his ill 
mother. Inasmuch as the plaintiffs would not relocate, 
Noorily's and Nastawa's employment with T&B ended on 
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February 14, 1992, and Deck and Levy, each of whom 
performed transition work for T&B, left the company in 
June and September 1992, respectively. 
 
C. Procedural History 
 
Noorily and Nastawa originally filed suit in the Superior 
Court of New Jersey alleging that T&B's refusal to pay them 
severance benefits was a breach of their employment 
contract. After T&B moved for dismissal on ERISA 
preemption grounds, the parties executed a stipulation of 
dismissal without prejudice. Then on May 19, 1993, Noorily 
and Nastawa filed this action as plan participants in the 
district court under ERISA S 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. 
S 1132(a)(1)(B), against T&B and its Employee Benefit Plan 
seeking benefits they claimed were due to them under 
T&B's severance plan.1 Levy and Deck filed separate, 
similar complaints on that date in the district court. The 
district court consolidated the three actions in June 1997 
at plaintiffs' request. As a matter of convenience we refer to 
the defendants simply as T&B. 
 
On November 4, 1994, T&B moved for sanctions against 
plaintiffs' attorneys for having allegedly improper ex parte 
contacts with three former T&B employees. A magistrate 
judge granted the sanctions motion on December 6, 1994, 
and precluded plaintiffs from calling these witnesses at 
trial. The plaintiffs then appealed to the district court 
which, through Judge Bissell, on August 17, 1995, upheld 
the order and dismissed the plaintiffs' appeal. At the outset 
of the trial Judge Hayden, on T&B's motion, expanded the 
scope of the sanctions by prohibiting the plaintiffs and their 
witnesses from testifying at the trial with respect to 
representations by these improperly contacted employees. 
 
The parties tried the case at a bench trial before Judge 
Hayden from June 23, 1998, to June 29, 1998. The court 
ruled in favor of the plaintiffs on July 7, 1998, in a 
comprehensive oral decision, finding that T&B had 
involuntarily terminated the plaintiffs' employment and had 
violated its fiduciary duty under ERISA by arbitrarily and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. It appears that the case could have proceeded under ERISA in the 
state courts. See ERISA S 502(e)(1), 29 U.S.C. S 1132(e)(1). 
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capriciously denying them severance benefits under its 
severance plan. In an August 6, 1998 judgment order, the 
court granted the plaintiffs substantial severance benefits, 
which included severance pay and medical benefits 
according to the schedule provided in T&B's plan. On 
plaintiffs' post-trial motion, the court by an order of 
October 19, 1998, awarded them attorney's fees, costs, and 
prejudgment interest. 
 
T&B has filed timely notices of appeal both from the 
August 6, 1998 order awarding plaintiffs severance benefits 
and from the October 19, 1998 order granting them 
attorney's fees, costs, and prejudgment interest. The 
plaintiffs have cross appealed from the order dismissing the 
appeal from the imposition of sanctions against them as 
well as from the determination limiting the use at trial of 
evidence regarding the improperly contacted employees' 
representations. The district court had subject matter 
jurisdiction under ERISA S 502(e)(1), 29 U.S.C. S 1132(e)(1), 
and 28 U.S.C. S 1331, and we have jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. S 1291. 
 
II. DISCUSSION 
 
A. Standard of review 
 
We exercise plenary review on this appeal because the 
outcome determinative historical facts are not in dispute, 
and we accept the district court's factual findings. Thus, 
this case essentially involves questions of law"with respect 
to the legal effect" of the severance plan. Atacs Corp. v. 
Trans World Communications, Inc., 155 F.3d 659, 665 (3d 
Cir. 1998). 
 
B. Was T&B Acting as a Fiduciary When It Decid ed That It 
   Would Not Provide the Plaintiffs with Severance Benefits 
   Under Its Severance Plan? 
 
We first address T&B's contention that its determination 
to deny the plaintiffs severance benefits was a "business 
decision" immune from the standards that section 404 of 
ERISA, 29 U.S.C. S 1104, establishes for fiduciaries. In 
considering this point we note that T&B acknowledges that 
its severance policy was a "welfare plan" as that term is 
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defined in ERISA S 3(1), 29 U.S.C. S 1002(1). T&B's dual 
role as the plan's administrator as well as the employer, 
however, complicates our analysis. The plan clearly reflects 
this dual role as it provides that "[a]ll fringe benefits 
covered under this policy are administered by the Corporate 
Benefits Committee" which consists of certain T&B officers. 
On the other hand, the plan provides that an award of 
severance pay is made when "the terminating manager 
believes the granting of such pay is appropriate." 
 
When an employer makes decisions about the design of 
a welfare plan, such as a severance plan, it functions as an 
employer and not as an administrator and thus it is not 
acting as a fiduciary. See Hlinka v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 
863 F.2d 279, 285 (3d Cir. 1988). Accordingly, an employer 
can create a plan that furthers its business interests, and 
it can act according to these interests in amending or 
terminating the plan. See Hozier v. Midwest Fasteners, Inc., 
908 F.2d 1155, 1162 (3d Cir. 1990). Moreover, to the 
degree that the plan gives an employer discretion, the 
employer is not a fiduciary when it makes determinations 
according to the plan's terms that affect employees' 
eligibility for benefits. See Berger v. Edgewater Steel Co., 
911 F.2d 911, 918 (3d Cir. 1990). Thus, in Berger, we held 
that the employer was not acting in a fiduciary capacity 
when it determined, as the plan permitted it to do, that the 
early retirement of certain employees was not in its best 
interest. See id. at 918-19. However, when the employer is 
administering the plan and paying out benefits, it acts as a 
fiduciary and must act in the interest of the plan's 
participants. See Hozier, 908 F.2d at 1158-59 (citing ERISA 
S 404, 29 U.S.C. S 1104, which establishes fiduciary 
standards under ERISA). 
 
In sum, then, the employer acts as a fiduciary when 
administering a plan but not when designing a plan or 
making business decisions, even though in all three 
situations its determinations may impact on its employees. 
It is important to keep these distinctions in mind when 
considering an ERISA case. 
 
As we have indicated, the severance plan in this case 
provided T&B with discretion in determining whether to 
award severance benefits for it provided for an award only 
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if the terminating manager thought that it was 
"appropriate" to do so. Inasmuch as the plan gave this 
discretion to T&B as an employer through its terminating 
manager rather than as an administrator through its 
Corporate Benefits Committee, T&B is correct in its 
contention that it was not acting in a fiduciary capacity 
when it determined that granting severance benefits to the 
plaintiffs would not be "appropriate" because it was not in 
T&B's interest to do so. Once T&B made this management 
determination, T&B as the administrator through its 
Corporate Benefits Committee was obliged to implement the 
decision and thus cannot be deemed to have violated its 
fiduciary duties by acting according to the "employer's" 
determination. See Berger, 911 F.2d at 918-19. Similarly, if 
T&B as employer had determined to award severance 
benefits then its Corporate Benefits Committee would have 
been obliged to implement that decision. The district court 
therefore erred in concluding that T&B had breached its 
fiduciary duties to the plaintiffs. 
 
Nevertheless, our conclusion that T&B did not act in a 
fiduciary capacity in its determination to deny severance 
benefits does not end the case because the plaintiffs are not 
suing simply for breach of fiduciary duty. Rather, their 
complaint and their arguments at trial and in this court 
show that they believe that they are entitled to benefits 
under the plan and that T&B misapplied the plan in 
denying them benefits. Thus, they have predicated their 
claims on breach of contract principles and, upon a proper 
showing, the claims could be upheld on that basis under 
ERISA. See Kemmerer v. ICI Americas Inc., 70 F.3d 281, 
287 (3d Cir. 1995). Of course, if we agree with the plaintiffs 
on their contract theory we can affirm even though we are 
rejecting the district court's reasoning that T&B violated its 
fiduciary obligations. See United States v. Soberon, 929 
F.2d 935, 940 (3d Cir. 1991).2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. T&B argues that plaintiffs cannot recover on contract principles as the 
severance plan does not create "vested contractual" rights. In view of our 
result we have no need to address this point. 
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C. Does T&B's Severance Plan Entitle the Plain tiffs to 
   Severance Benefits? 
 
T&B argues that in rejecting the plaintiffs' claims for 
severance benefits, it properly exercised the discretion the 
plan allowed to it. In focusing upon the discretion granted 
in the plan, T&B invokes a body of case law providing that 
in cases brought under ERISA S 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. 
S 1132(a)(1)(B), a court applies de novo review in construing 
an employee benefit plan unless "the benefit plan gives the 
administrator . . . discretionary authority to determine 
eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan." 
Ulmer v. Harsco Corp., 884 F.2d 98, 101 (3d Cir. 1989) 
(citing Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 
101, 111, 109 S.Ct. 948, 954-55 (1989)). If the plan does 
grant such discretion, then a deferential standard of review 
is appropriate. See Bruch, 489 U.S. at 111-14, 109 S.Ct. at 
954-57. However, these cases apply only to decisions 
reached by administrators or fiduciaries, not employers. As 
T&B itself has argued that it did not act as a fiduciary in 
denying benefits, it cannot now rely on this case law. 
Accordingly, in evaluating the plaintiffs' claims on breach of 
contract principles, these cases are not controlling. 
 
The district court held that T&B involuntarily terminated 
the plaintiffs and that its decision to deny them benefits 
was arbitrary and capricious. Thus, the parties regard the 
court as having held that T&B "constructively discharged" 
plaintiffs, although in its opinion of July 7, 1998, the court 
did not explicitly so hold.3 In the circumstances the parties 
quite naturally focus on the constructive discharge issue. 
But we need not review the district court's decision that the 
plaintiffs were involuntarily terminated because, assuming 
without deciding that the district court was correct on that 
point, the plan provides for the granting of severance pay 
only when "the terminating manager believes the granting of 
such pay is appropriate." 
 
Unquestionably ERISA permits corporations to create 
welfare plans that give their managers wide discretion. See, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The court did suggest, however, during oral argument at the 
conclusion of the trial that a constructive discharge and an involuntary 
termination were the same thing. App. at 1802. 
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e.g., McNab v. General Motors Corp., 162 F.3d 959, 962 (7th 
Cir. 1998). Indeed, it might be possible to read T&B's plan 
to render unreviewable the terminating manager's decision 
to deny severance benefits. Nevertheless we have no reason 
to consider that possibility for the district court's factual 
findings make it clear that T&B's decision to deny plaintiffs 
severance benefits was not "arbitrary or capricious" and 
thus we must uphold it. Of course, we refer to arbitrary or 
capricious with respect to T&B's conduct as an employer 
not as a fiduciary for, as we have explained, the cases 
establishing a standard for reviewing a fiduciary's conduct 
are not controlling. Clearly, there is a class of decisions 
that might be arbitrary when considered from the point of 
view of a plan participant that are perfectly appropriate for 
an employer. 
 
T&B argues that we should use a "bad faith" standard in 
reviewing its conduct. This argument is substantial because 
in Berger, after we rejected the application of a fiduciary 
standard with respect to an employer's decisions denying 
requests for retirement, we indicated that the employer's 
determination nevertheless was "subject to no more than 
the minimal obligation of good faith." Berger, 911 F.2d at 
919. We are aware, however, that other courts have applied 
an "arbitrary and capricious" standard for judicial review in 
circumstances similar to those here. See McNab, 162 F.3d 
at 962. While a "bad faith" standard would be more 
deferential than the "arbitrary or capricious" standard, we 
have no need to consider if it is applicable here as T&B did 
not act arbitrarily or capriciously and therefore it cannot 
possibly have acted in bad faith. Finally, on the standard of 
review issue, we point out that we cannot conceive how a 
court could impose a more exacting standard than that the 
employer's decision not be arbitrary or capricious. 
 
The district court in reaching its result indicated that 
T&B's policy always has been to pay terminated employees, 
except those who left voluntarily, severance pay. Thus, 
when T&B moved its Electronic Division to South Carolina 
in 1990 it made severance payments to employees who 
declined to move.4 The court understandably also indicated 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The Electronic Division is apparently distinct from the Electrical 
Division. 
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that each of the plaintiffs had a compelling personal reason 
to decline T&B's offer of employment in Memphis. 
Moreover, the court indicated that "[o]ther than the 
engineers in the engineering department, all employees who 
did not move to Memphis received severance payment[s] in 
accord with [T&B's] policy." 
 
The court further stated that T&B's management 
considered the plaintiffs to be critical employees but that 
T&B was thinking of its interests rather than those of the 
plaintiffs' in wanting them to move to Memphis. 5 Thus, the 
court said that it was only when T&B discovered the extent 
of the reluctance of the engineers to move that it 
determined that "anyone who did not transfer his position 
would not receive severance and would be considered as 
having resigned." Yet the court recognized that T&B 
perceived that its employees' unanticipated decision not to 
relocate was threatening its decision to move its Electrical 
Division. 
 
Significantly, the court made the following findings: 
 
       The management decision in this case which isolated 
       the engineers who declined to transfer out of all others 
       directly affected the administration of severance to all 
       employees who did not relocate, and as such I find that 
       it was a breach of fiduciary duty to administer the plan. 
 
       I find the act of applying the severance plan benefits 
       to all employees, whether they were going or staying, 
       whether they were in transition, not in transition, was 
       an act of welfare plan administration, and in so 
       undertaking that act I find under the [Hozier v. Midwest 
       Fasteners, 908 F.2d 1155] analysis that the company 
       had a fiduciary duty to administer the plan with the 
       benefit of the employees in mind and not its own 
       management welfare in mind. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The plaintiffs contend that they were not critical to T&B and that 
subsequent events have demonstrated it has prospered without their 
services. While plaintiffs may be correct in that assertion, their 
argument 
is immaterial because the significant fact is that, as the district court 
found, T&B thought that the engineers were critical, and we judge T&B's 
conduct on the basis of its view of the situation. 
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       I find therefore that by arbitrarily denying welfare 
       benefits to certain employees whose jobs were 
       significantly affected by the acquisition and conferring 
       those benefits arguably to people equally affected by the 
       acquisition was a breach of that duty. 
 
The court also indicated that "the uncontroverted testimony 
supports my analysis that in an effort to combat a threat to 
its management decision to [acquire] the Tennessee based 
company, management decided in midstream to administer 
its severance policy in a way that perverted the spirit and 
intent of the severance plan under ERISA and its own 
written policy." 
 
Ultimately the court concluded that: 
 
       Overall then, I find the acquisition of American 
       Electric created a termination event that required 
       administration of severance plan to all employees. 
       Those employees choosing to accept . . . an offer of 
       continued employment were not terminated. Those 
       declining the offer were effectively terminated under the 
       circumstances established by the evidence, which 
       include geographical distance of the relocation, the 
       certainty of continued employment unameliorated by 
       management, and foreseeable effects on family life 
       which was specifically not considered on a individual 
       basis by management. 
 
Thus, the court believed "that management's withholding of 
these employees' severance pay was based on punitive 
coercive motives designed solely to protect and benefit the 
employer to the detriment of plaintiffs." Consequently, in 
the court's view the plaintiffs were entitled to severance 
benefits. 
 
We cannot accept the district court's legal conclusions. 
First of all, of course, for the reasons we already have set 
forth we reject the district court's application offiduciary 
standards here. Moreover, we see no reason for concluding 
that "the terminating manager [who did not] believe[ ] the 
granting of [severance] pay [was] appropriate" was arbitrary 
or capricious in reaching that conclusion. In Berger we 
indicated "that only the employer determines whether an 
employee's retirement is in the company's best interest. 
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Neither the plan administrator nor the pension board have 
the authority to override the company's business decision." 
Berger, 911 F.2d at 918. 
 
The T&B plan provided that the test for granting 
severance pay upon involuntary termination was whether 
the terminating manager believed "the granting of such pay 
is appropriate." We fail to see how the denial of severance 
pay was inappropriate as a business decision reached by 
T&B. Plainly, there was nothing arbitrary or capricious 
about T&B's decision to discourage employees it regarded 
as critical from terminating their employment. Indeed, the 
sincerity and reasonableness of T&B's decision was 
demonstrated by its willingness to absorb substantial 
expenses to relocate the plaintiffs. 
 
The fact that in some other circumstances T&B awarded 
severance pay to other employees who would not relocate in 
no sense required it to find that it was appropriate to do so 
in plaintiffs' cases. Obviously, an employer may make a 
determination as to the appropriateness of granting 
severance pay based on the circumstances of each case and 
thus past practice cannot control its exercise of discretion 
in other circumstances. See McNab, 162 F.3d at 961-62; 
Nevill v. Shell Oil Co., 835 F.2d 209, 211 (9th Cir. 1987); cf. 
Nazay v. Miller, 949 F.2d 1323, 1336 (3d Cir. 1991) 
(administrator's decision). The district court's reasoning 
was flawed as it considered whether T&B was acting 
arbitrarily or capriciously as a fiduciary, and thus the court 
was taking into account only the interests of the employees 
as plan participants or beneficiaries. Viewed from the 
correct prospective, T&B plainly was not arbitrary or 
capricious in denying severance benefits and accordingly it 
is entitled to a judgment in its favor. 
 
T&B also argues that the district court abused its 
discretion by awarding plaintiffs attorney's fees and costs 
under ERISA S 502(g)(1), 29 U.S.C. S 1132(g)(1), as well as 
prejudgment interest. Obviously, we have no need to linger 
on this point as the reversal of the award of severance 
benefits compels the reversal of the award of prejudgment 
interest and attorney's fees and costs because plaintiffs are 
no longer prevailing parties. Finally, T&B argues that the 
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district court erred in certain evidentiary rulings, but in 
view of our result this issue is moot. 
 
We carefully have examined plaintiffs' cross-appeal with 
respect to the sanctions and find that it is clearly without 
merit. In any event, we find nothing in plaintiffs' brief to 
support a conclusion that the excluded evidence if admitted 
could have created a record that would have led us to reach 
a different result than the one we set forth. While plaintiffs 
suggested at trial that the testimony would establish T&B's 
liability, in view of our conclusions which are predicated on 
legal determinations based on the plan itself, we reject this 
contention.6 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
In closing our opinion we emphasize that while we are 
treating this case as involving involuntary terminations and 
that our result for this reason may seem harsh, the term 
"involuntary termination" must be understood in the 
context of this case. The parties agree that T&B wanted the 
plaintiffs to remain in its employ, and thus T&B offered 
them significant incentives to move to Memphis. 
Accordingly, this case is not one in which the employees 
were intentionally set adrift by an uncaring employer. 
Moreover, this case in no sense involved oppressive or 
intolerable employment conditions such as might have 
constituted a constructive discharge in a discrimination 
case. Quite to the contrary, this case concerns the effect on 
the plaintiffs of T&B's unassailable business decision to 
move its Electrical Division to Memphis. At bottom, then, 
this case involves nothing more than an employer 
determining that it is not appropriate to grant severance 
benefits to employees leaving their employment when the 
employer wishes them to remain.7 We will not reject such a 
decision. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. It is questionable whether plaintiffs have preserved the sanctions 
issue 
as they apparently intend to pursue it only if we remand the case for "a 
new trial." Br. at 51 n.10; Reply Br. at 1 n.1. Of course, we are not 
remanding for a new trial. Nevertheless, we are rejecting their 
contentions on the merits. 
 
7. We also point out that the decision to deny severance pay did not 
nullify the plaintiffs' pension rights. 
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For the foregoing reasons the orders of August 6, 1998, 
and October 19, 1998, will be reversed, and the order of 
August 17, 1995, will be affirmed. The matter will be 
remanded to the district court for entry of a judgment in 
favor of T&B. 
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